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2Abstract
Theoretical and empirical work on minimum wage policy can be characterised as
being located within two main perspectives. On the one hand, there is strong
opposition to this policy (e.g. neo-classical models) on the grounds that interference
in the free labour market will lead to negative employment consequences. On the
other hand, more recent approaches (e.g. dynamic monopsony model, radical
segmentation model, efficiency wage theory) support this policy and oppose the role
played by an ‘invisible hand’ in the market. Given the conflicting findings in the
literature about minimum wage policy, the influence of the National Minimum Wage
on employment is reconsidered in this paper by examining the minimum wage’s
influence on the employment of young workers within the hospitality sector in urban
and rural areas. Preliminary findings based on an exploratory study of 29 hospitality
firms suggest that the National Minimum Wage has had little impact on employment
practices, and has not led to the substitution of young workers for older workers in
either the rural or urban areas.
Keywords: Minimum Wage, Young Workers, Employment Practices, Pay
Structure, Hospitality Sector
31. Introduction
The economics of minimum wage policy are controversial topics that have gained
renewed interest in recent years among economists and social scientists alike
(Dolado et al., 1996; Dawkins, 1997). In Britain there has been a resurgence of
interest in this issue among researchers as the National Minimum Wage (NMW) was
implemented on the 1st of April 1999.
The Low Pay Commission (LPC), an independent body was formed to advise the
government on implementing the NMW. It identified that young people, women,
ethnic minorities, people with disabilities, part-time workers, lone parents, temporary
and seasonal workers, and homeworkers could be most affected by the NMW
because they are more likely to be low paid than other workers (Low Pay
Commission, 1998). As a result of the LPC’s recommendations, the NMW was
initially set at £3.60 an hour for adult workers over the age of 21 and a lower youth
development rate of £3.00 was applied to young workers between the ages of 18 and
21. Workers below the age of 18 were exempted from the NMW. On 1st October
2000 the government increased the adult rate to £3.701 and in June of the same year,
the youth development rate was increased to £3.20. This pilot study was carried out
in the middle of July 2000. Thus any changes in employment policy towards young
workers as a result of this increase would be captured in this study.
Youth labour markets have unique characteristics that make them significantly
different from the adult labour market, hence there have been quite a number of
recent studies focusing on youth in the labour market (e.g. Deakin, 1996; Dustmann
et al., 1996; Roberts, 1995).  The nature of the involvement of youth in the labour
market has shown tremendous changes over the years. Youths today seem to seek
financial independence from their parents at a much younger age. Their transition
from school to work is more gradual as the period of overlap between education and
work has increased noticeably (Micklewright et al., 1994; Dustman et al., 1996; and
Lucas and Lammont, 1998).
Currently in a labour force of just under 30 million workers aged 16 years and over
in the United Kingdom, young workers (16-24 years) represent 14% of the labour
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4force (National Statistics, 2001a). The Labour Force Survey also indicates that of the
total population of this age group, 62% are in employment (National Statistics,
2001b). This is partly due to the growth of students engaged in part-time
employment. For example the proportion of students of the age of 16-24 in full-time
education and employment in Britain has increased from 23% in 1984 to 39% in
2000 (National Statistics, 2001b). One sector that has attracted a large number of
young workers is the hospitality sector. During the 1980s, involvement of young
workers (under 21 year olds) within the British hospitality sector grew due in part to
the increasing size of the fast food industry. The Low Pay Commission (1998)
identified the hospitality sector, along with retail, business services (contract
cleaning and security), social care, hairdressing, agriculture, and clothing and
footwear as industries with the highest concentration of low paid workers.2
This paper begins by highlighting the current theoretical developments on the
implications of the minimum wage on employment, followed by an outline of the
methodology employed in this study. The succeeding sections will present the
preliminary findings of the effect of the minimum wage on the employment, training
and substitution of young workers, on the pay structure of young workers, and on the
business strategies used by the firms in dealing with the increase in the NMW.
2. Evaluation of the Minimum Wages Theory
Over the years there have been a number of economic models that have tried to
explain the behaviour of the labour market, and therefore the relationship between
wages and employment. The models range from a simple ‘supply and demand’
model to more dynamic two-sector models.
2.1 Classical Approach
The basic textbook competitive model simply strikes off the minimum wage as
hazardous for the labour market. This model, which uses the simple ‘supply and
demand’ approach in a single market depends crucially on the assumption that
workers are homogeneous and their skills and level of effort are given exogenously.
Wages are set at the marginal productivity level and a minimum wage that is set
above this equilibrium level is expected to reduce employment. Assumptions of
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5perfect information among employers and employees are used by the neo-classicals
to justify their reason for believing that market wages will prevail at a standard rate
for a given efficient level of labour. However, it can be argued that this explanation
is theoretically naïve and empirically inaccurate. In the real, more complex society,
you would find a broader range of wage differentials that differ across segments in a
number of ways, including by region, gender, race, age, skill and education
attainment (Rubery, 1997; Lucas and Langlois, 2000b).
The perfect competitive model was popular in the 1970s and 1980s, as most studies
during that period found small but significant negative employment effects of higher
minimum wage on workers (Brown et al., 1982). This explains why the monopsony
model, which advocates positive employment effects of a minimum wage was not
popular at that time. As claimed by Brown et al., (1982), “the monopsony model has
not motivated much recent work, perhaps because there is little evidence that it is
important in modern-day low wage labour markets.”(p489) However, there was a
major development in the 1990s when the study by Card and Krueger (1995)
challenged this conventional notion of minimum wages. As a result, over the last
decade economic models (e.g. monopsony models, radical segmentation theory and
efficiency wage theory) that include involvement of firms in the wage setting
process, as opposed to the role played by an ‘invisible hand’ in the market, began to
gain popularity (Edwards and Gilman, 1999). These models were able to explain the
increasingly weak link that was found between the minimum wage and low wage
employment opportunities.
2.2 Latest Approaches
The basic monopsony model suggests that the monopsony power of employers
allows them to be in a position to depress wages to less than the workers’ marginal
productivity level or the true market rate. Therefore, an increment in wages as a
result of a minimum wage could be carried out easily without raising prices or
reducing employment. An extension of this model, the dynamic monopsony model,
takes into account the labour market frictions (neglected by most traditional models)
in explaining the positive employment effect of the minimum wage. According to
this model, the cost of looking for jobs results in workers accepting employment
even if the wage is below the marginal productivity level. Each job searcher adopts a
6reservation wage that is set at the equilibrium of the marginal benefits of search and
the marginal cost of search. In order to optimise lifetime discounted income, jobs that
pay more than reservation wages are accepted. It is important to point out that in
most cases the reservation wage of young workers is lower than for adult workers,
and this can explain the reason for the high concentration of young workers in the
low paid sector3. The advantage that the monopsony model has over the perfect
competitive model is that it acknowledges the heterogeneity among firms that causes
the minimum wage to affect different firms in different ways, in contrast to the
unknown market forces (Edwards and Gilman, 1999; Lucas and Langlois, 2000b).
However this model does not explain what the institutional forces at play actually are
or what the role of wages in the production process is (Edwards and Gilman, 1998).
The shortcomings of the monopsony model are taken into account in an efficiency
wage framework. This approach assumes that the labour market is segmented into
primary and secondary type; and wages are paid accordingly. Edwards and Gilman
(1998) for instance argue that this is the first model that has placed real labour
market observations within a formal economic theory. The segmentation in the
labour market can explain the wide variation of wages among workers and also
suggests “that workers will not be priced out of a job if they can raise their
productivity” (Lucas and Langlois, 2000b:3). The efficiency wage theory suggests
that firms will pay wages above the market clearing level as this can increase
workers’ efforts and also morale. Therefore, if a minimum wage is effective, an
employer will be willing to pay more than the minimum wage level to motivate
workers through wages rather than to monitor employees that shirk from their
responsibilities, which conceivably is a more expensive alternative.
The general criticism of this model, as mentioned by Botwinick, is the acceptance of
higher wages as a substitute for the costs of supervision (cited in Edwards and
Gilman, 1999:23). In other words, if employers pay higher wages, they will not
monitor their workers at all and these workers are now expected to obey working
regulations, instead of shirking from duties. It is an accepted fact that “employees
will avoid their duties if they can and that employers thus face costs of supervision”
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7(Edwards and Gilman, 1998:9) whether the wages are high or not. The link between
wages and effort is not as simple as explained in the efficiency wage theories,
whereby workers either obey or shirk. There is a strong relationship between all the
actors in the production process in determining the final outcome (Edwards and
Gilman, 1998).
The radical segmentation theory is similar to the efficiency wage model, but differs
in being oriented towards the dualist approach. As suggested by Reich et al. (1973),
the labour market conditions can best be explained as an outcome of four
segmentation processes: primary and secondary markets, within the primary sector,
by race and finally by sex. However this model can be considered as an advanced
version of the efficiency wage approach as it recognises pay determination as part of
a political process, a control strategy by firms, not merely as a process of achieving
economic efficiency (Edwards and Gilman, 1998). The implication of a minimum
wage in this model is that “wages are seen not as the result of a calculus of supply
and demand of efficiency wage consideration, but as the outcome of deep-seated
forces in the economy” (Edwards and Gilman, 1998:10). Therefore a minimum wage
will not cause a distinct ‘big bang’ effect as it will be part of the continuing dynamics
of the labour market that faces a whole series of other market pressures (Edwards
and Gilman, 1998). Similar to the efficiency wage theory, the radical segmentation
theory demonstrates a lack of justification for a distinct separate labour market. As
stated by Botwinick, “the evidence that there are indeed distinct market segments is
lacking” (cited by Edwards and Gillman, 1999:24). Another key weakness in the
efficiency and radical segmentation theory is the ignorance of “the possibility of an
equivalent effort/reward exchange in the secondary sector” (Lucas and Langlois,
2000b:4). As stressed by Edwards and Gilman (1998), wages are supposedly used as
a motivational tool and seen as only essential in the primary labour market, while
there is no room in the theories for engagement of firms from the secondary sector in
complex negotiations/bargaining.
In a real economy, the coverage and compliance with a minimum wage are far from
universal, hence compared with a single sector model, a two sector model (one with
minimum wage coverage and the other without it) would be more practical in
investigating the effectiveness of a minimum wage policy (Fields, 1994). Some
8sectors may not be covered because of legislation. For example the wages councils
and wages boards that existed in Britain between 1909-1993 did not cover all
industries. Conversely the NMW, which was implemented on 1st April 1999 in
Britain covers all business sectors. Even though the legislation says that all industries
must comply with the NMW, non-compliance among businesses does exist,
especially in firms operating at the edges of the legitimate labour market, and
particularly in the informal economy. The vulnerability of workers involved in these
areas of activity makes them reluctant to jeopardise their jobs by challenging their
employer or by reporting non-compliance (Low Pay Commission, 2000).
Therefore there is a sense that in the real economy juxtaposed to an ideological
paradigm, a two-sector model is more effective in explaining the labour market than
a one-sector model. According to this model, an increase in the minimum wage will
lead to a reduction in employment in the covered sector. This labour will move into
the sectors not covered by the minimum wage or simply quit from the market
altogether (Mincer, 1976).4 As a result there will be excess supply of labour in the
sectors not covered by the minimum wage and the wages in this sector will fall. In
short “the effect of the minimum wage on total employment according to this
approach depends on the elasticity of labour supply and reservation wages of those
who do not obtain covered sector work, as well as more obvious factors such as the
size of the covered sector and the elasticity of labour demand” (Brown et al.,
1982:490). Equally, the number of firms who do not comply can be considered as a
factor determining the influence of a minimum wage on total employment. This
approach has attempted to move away from the traditional competitive model by
suggesting that the ‘total employment’ of the economy may not be affected because
of the constant movement between the covered and not covered sector. However, this
theory still supports the main framework of the competitive model that an increase in
the minimum wage will lead to job losses in the covered sector.
3. Methodology
The effect of the minimum wage policy on employment has been traditionally
examined by studies using three different types of methodology: times series studies;
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9cross sectional studies; or single/small group of low wage industry studies. The
present research study employed the latter as this method takes into account the more
dynamic details that are relevant to firms in different locations. Postal questionnaire
and telephone interviews were targeted at managers/owners of businesses in the
hospitality sector. The survey was designed to generate data concerning workforce
profiles and pay structures, and to capture information and informed opinions
regarding the NMW.
Regional variation in minimum wages is rejected by those who support the
implementation of the NMW based on the reason that even though it is possible to
identify pay differences between regions, all regions experience low pay (Hunter and
Kelly, 2000). However, two different geographical areas are selected for this study in
order to identify whether there are significant differences in the implications of the
NMW for young workers between rural and urban areas. North Manchester
represents the urban area, while North Wales represents the rural area. According to
the Low Pay Commission (1998:136) “the greatest impact of the NMW in the
hospitality sector will be in the smallest outlets, low paying areas and those
businesses heavily dependent on seasonal visitors”. Both areas chosen for this study
are recognised to be in low paying regions, and the businesses in North Wales rely
significantly on seasonal visitors.
The sub-sectors of the hospitality sector with more than 10 workplaces published in
the Yellow Pages formed the sampling frame for North Manchester and North
Wales. Although pubs form the largest activity in each area, there is a marked
difference in the mix of activities between the areas. Activities that are excluded in
both North Wales and North Manchester (less than 10 workplaces) are banqueting
and function rooms, conference facilities and services, holiday accommodation and
hostels. A one in 25 random sample by sub-sector gave a survey sample of 79
workplaces for North Manchester and 93 workplaces for North Wales, where two
sets of questionnaires, one in English and one in Welsh were used. The response rate
of 29 questionnaires (17%) is consistent with the Lucas and Langlois (2000) study
(15%).
                                                                                                                                                                    
the labour force.
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Of the 29 respondents, only 10 (7 from North Wales and 3 from North Manchester)
agreed to be interviewed on the subject of the NMW. The majority of the
respondents preferred telephone interviews. All the 10 respondents were contacted to
arrange for an interview but only 7 respondents were interviewed. The three who
were not interviewed either could not be contacted or changed their minds for being
interviewed due to a busy work schedule. Acknowledging the sensitive nature of the
research topic, a response rate of 17% (29 questionnaires) from the postal survey and
7 interviews is a reasonable sample to be analysed as part of the pilot study to
provide vital guidance for the future direction of this research.
4. Findings of the Survey
A wide array of results concerning the employment and attractiveness of young
workers was obtained from the questionnaire survey and interviews. Some of the
main preliminary findings pertaining to the NMW are presented in the following
sections.
4.1 Employment, Training and Substitution of Workers
Generally before the ‘Card and Krueger’ era (prior to the early 1990s), most studies
frequently found an inverse relationship between the level of a minimum wage and
youth employment. A large amount of literature over the years especially in the U.S
showed a clear consensus on this negative relationship, with the only disagreement
centring on the size and significance of the relationship. However, compared to the
1970s and 1980s, recent studies have contributed to a broader range of the estimates
that both supports (e.g. Card and Krueger, 1995; Katz and Krueger, 1992) and also
opposes (e.g. Neumark and Wascher, 1992; Currie and Fallick, 1996; Bazen and
Martin, 1991) the minimum wage policy.
This survey shows that a large proportion (almost 75%) of employers in the
hospitality sector in North Wales and North Manchester are currently employing
young workers (under 21 year olds).  Over half of the employees employed in the
sample were young workers aged under 20. The majority of these were students,
part-timers and females. The only noticeable difference that was found between the
urban and rural labour markets involves the additional labour market constraints
faced by the businesses in rural areas. As a result of limited labour supply in this
11
area, firms have to rely on particular types of workers, not necessarily out of choice.
Clear evidence of this situation was explained by an employer of a single
independent restaurant in North Wales:
“As there is one main large employer, plus a larger mental nursing
home in close proximity, they employ most of the good workers in
the area and also pay very good wages. Therefore we are left with
mainly school and college students who work weekends and
holidays”.
(Restaurant, North Wales)
As an overwhelming majority of the employers in both these areas employ young
workers, the impact that the youth development rate under the NMW will have on
the young workers can be analysed in this study. Tackling the first issue on the
employment effect of the NMW shows that a majority of the respondents in North
Wales have indicated in the questionnaire and also in the interviews that there has
not been any change in the workforce profile as a result of the NMW. However it is
interesting to point out that two workplaces have increased full-time employees and
there are also two workplaces that have employed more part-time employees.
The majority of the respondents in North Manchester have also indicated that there
have not been any changes in the employment of workers as a result of the NMW.
Even though this is just a small sample, there is no apparent evidence that indicates
that employers have taken drastic action in reducing staff numbers, as feared by
traditional labour economists. On the contrary there has been an increase in
employment in both these areas, perhaps due to other factors, such as an expansion in
the respective business or growth in the tourism industries in general.
One of the main fears of introducing a differential minimum wage rate between adult
and young workers is the degree of exchangeability between these groups of
workers. A minimum wage may lead to employers employing cheaper young
workers to replace older workers and also substituting young adult workers with
under 18 year old workers who are not covered by the NMW. Lucas and Langlois
(2000) found no justification for this fear in the hospitality and retail sector as the
introduction of the lower development rate did not lead to any substitution effect.
This is also the scenario in the United States, whereby Card’s (1992) result ruled out
any widespread substitution of young for older workers.
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The findings from this study are also consistent with the above results. An
overwhelming majority in both North Wales and North Manchester responded that
they had not substituted young adult workers (18-21 year olds) with youths below the
age of 18 as a result of the increase in the youth development rate. All of the
respondents also stated that they did not substitute older workers with younger
workers. This shows that there is a distinction between younger workers and older
workers and employers appear not to simply employ staff because they are cheaper.
Looking into the provision of training, employers have started to emphasise that
investment in human capital is now “a necessary if not sufficient condition for
improving economic performance” (Sutherland, 1999: 353). Investment in human
capital can be made in the forms of general and vocational education and training.
The distinguishing feature of investment in human capital is the potential social or
public benefits that create positive externality or spillover effect (Sutherland, 1999).
This is one major reason for employers to be reluctant to bear the cost of training
employees on their own. Therefore the question arises as to how will the NMW
affect training of young workers?
This study shows, albeit suggestively, that there is no basis for the fear that training
for young workers will be affected as a result of the NMW. A majority (11 out of 13)
of the respondents in North Wales and North Manchester did not agree that they
would be reducing training because of the NMW. However a large proportion (5 out
of 12) of the respondents in North Wales did not agree that there will be a positive
affect on training, while a minority (4 out of 12) agreed on the positive effect and the
rest of the respondents were unsure of the outcome. From the seven interviews
carried out, only one guesthouse in North Wales provided the opportunity for their
staff to gain a NVQ qualification in first aid, welcoming guests and computer
training. These employees were also encouraged to take part in the British horse
society examination in riding and road safety. This guesthouse is different from other
hospitality establishments as it also has a riding centre, so training is important in this
business. According to the owner of this place the introduction of the youth
development rate has in fact positively affected the training for young workers.
“We are clearer about training time and if the training is done with
an affiliation the with local college, then it is independent of what
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you are paying workers. It splits training from employment. So you
pay them to muck up stables and you don’t pay them when they are
students”.
(Guesthouse, North Wales)
The rest of the six establishments only provided informal training such as on the job
training, and an introduction of health and safety regulations. According to the
respondents, they felt that this training is sufficient for the employees to carry the job
out effectively. All the employers seem to pay full wages to their employees during
the training period.
Regarding the implications of the youth development rate on training for young
workers in North Manchester, a number of respondents (4 out of 8) agreed that the
youth development rate will have a positive effect on training of young workers
whilst the rest of the respondents were unsure. As the respondents interviewed were
all from small establishments, training was just part of covering routine health and
safety regulations and on the job training, and not an important part of their
employment policy. Therefore, so far the NMW has not affected the training of
workers in this sample.
“We do have health and safety programmes that all employees have
to take part in on the premises. Everyone will get a copy of the
regulation and they have to sign to say that they understood it. We
are trying to make sure that they are aware of the danger to
themselves and other people. We do not have any accredited
training, as we are only a very tiny restaurant. If we are one of the
major food chains then we need accredited training”.
 (Restaurant, North Manchester)
4.2 Pay Structure
The Government has been particularly concerned about the need to protect the
position of young people from being exploited by employers. However at the same
time they understand that it is essential to “avoid reducing the relative attractiveness
to young people of staying on in education and training, and also avoid discouraging
employers from providing training for those in work” (Department of Trade and
Industry, 1998:3). This is the main reason for those below the age of 18 to be
exempted from the NMW and for a lower development rate for 18-21 year olds.
Recent reviews carried out by the Low Pay Commission found that most employers
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were found to be paying the adult rate from age 18 onwards, therefore the youth
development rate appeared not to have been utilised (Low Pay Commission, 2000).
A majority of the employers in North Wales (7 out of 12) stated that they were
already paying 18-21 year olds more than £3.20 before the new rate came into force
in June 2000. Most were paying £3.60, with two paying £3.25 and £4.00
respectively. However a large minority (5 out of 12) had to increase young workers’
pay, and all confirmed that this increase was to £3.20. Another employer was already
paying £3.20. Therefore the youth development rate seems to be utilised in a rural,
low paying area like North Wales, but is not necessarily paid to all young workers. In
North Manchester, three firms stated they were already paying more than £3.20
before June 2000 (£3.50, £3.60 and £3.70), with another already paying £3.20. Of the
three who did not, only one stated they had increased pay to £3.20 in June to comply
with the new rate, but the data do not indicate if the other two had also complied.
Thus after 1st June two firms were utilising the youth development rate.
Fewer respondents disclosed details about their pay structures before and after June
2000. One of the reasons for the low response to this question is because a majority
of the employers in North Wales (11 out of 18) stated that they did not have age-
related pay. Even so figure 1 provides more specific information about the lowest
hourly rates applicable to each age group. The pay structures for various age groups
of young workers in North Wales are varied, but the lower and upper boundaries are
similar for all young workers. The wages for workers below the age of 18 ranged
from £2.75 to £4.00 before, and also after the increase in the youth development rate
in June 2000. It could have been expected that the wages of exempt workers would
not have changed, but figure 1 indicates that in some cases the initial youth
development rate of £3.00 was utilised for exempt workers and workers aged 18-21,
and that firms simultaneously raised the wages of both groups by the same amount.
The minimum hourly pay in the sample for young adult workers before June 2000
ranged from £3.00 to £4.00 but after June 2000, in complying with the increase in the
youth development rate, the lower boundary of the pay range increased to £3.20
while the upper boundary remained at £4.00. One interesting feature that can be
observed in figure 1 is that there seems to be a more diverse pay structure after June
2000 for young adult workers, with some employers having increased pay to more
15
than £3.20. This might be as a result of employers having anticipated a further
increase in the NMW in 2001, so they may have decided to give their employees
staged increases in wages in order to spread the costs more gradually.
Figure 1: Pay Structure for Various Age of Young Workers, North Wales
       Under 18 18 year olds
                19 year olds 20 year olds
             21 year olds
Figure 2 shows that the mean wages for each age group in North Wales have
generally increased. This serves to highlight an increase in mean wages even for the
age groups that are exempted from the NMW; i.e. those below the age of 18, as noted
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above. However, the wages of this group of workers are considerably lower than the
wages of young adult workers. The mean wages for young adult workers after June
2000 are comfortably above the current youth development rate of £3.20. The mean
wage rates for 20 and 21 year olds after June 2000 also seem to be close to the new
adult minimum wage rate of £3.70, suggesting that these age groups may be
considered as adults by most businesses.
Figure 2: Mean Wages, North Wales
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Median wages are also plotted in Figure 3. The median value is not affected by
outliers, while the mean value is affected by outliers, which leads to an undervalue or
overvalue of the real average value (Levin 1987). In this case, the median values for
workers below 18 year olds and 18 year olds differ considerably from the mean
value. This suggests the presence of outliers in this distribution, so the median would
be a better estimator of changes in pay. However the main conclusion on movements
in wage levels, regardless of using the mean or median, remains the same.  There is a
distinct increase in median wages for workers below the age of 18 from £3.00 to
£3.20. The median wages for young adult workers are also comfortably above the
current youth development rate, especially for the 19, 20 and 21 year olds. The
median wage of 20 and 21 year olds before and after June 2000 seems to be at £3.60,
which as noted earlier implies the acceptance of these age groups as adult workers by
employers.
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Figure 3: Median Wages, North Wales
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strategy or select a less strategic but more reactive approach. As observed by
Schuler and Jackson (1987), even though these strategies are distinct, they are not
mutually exclusive and in reality an organisation may pursue more that one strategy
simultaneously (cited in Brown and Crossman, 2000).
Generally the evidence from North Wales and North Manchester as shown in table 1
tends to suggest that employers did not take any action. This is because a majority of
the respondents (11 out of 19) were not affected by the increase in the youth
development rate. Out of those affected by the increase, a majority of the employers
were prone to carry out reactive or ad hoc actions of increasing prices or accepting a
lower profit, rather than following strategic actions of either cost-minimisation or
quality enhancement. The ‘maybe’ response is also more dominant than the
‘definitely’ response and this further supports the idea that the establishments may
behave in a more ad hoc or spontaneous manner. This may suggest that there is not
necessarily a clear cut option to deal with an increase in the NMW, or that employers
prefer to keep their options open.
Even though the majority of employers in North Wales and North Manchester are not
contemplating reducing staff levels because of the increase in the youth development
rate, there has been discontentment among employers in North Wales and also North
Manchester about the increase in the NMW. One employer indicated that he had to
increase the wages of all employees in order to maintain pay differentials
“I had to increase wages of age group 16- 18 year olds who were
previously paid £2.75-£3 per hour to £3-£3.20 per hour. The main
increase has been in our good permanent mature workers, who are
all part-time workers for me but have full-time posts elsewhere.
Therefore they have to pay a higher rate of tax. These are the
workers for whom I have had to increase their wages from £3.75 to
between £4 and £5 per hour, just to keep them. Consequently, as we
are unable to increase prices, profits will be reduced and as all the
other cost escalating, it makes it a very tenuous position”.
(Restaurant, North Wales)
“The NMW is killing business!”
(Café, North Manchester)
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Table 1: Reaction Strategy for Businesses in both North Wales and
               North Manchester
Strategy Definitely Maybe No
Cost Minimisation
Changes in workers’ pay and benefits structures (n=13)
Reduce number of staff employed (n=16)
Reduce working hours (n=17)
Employ more part-time workers (n=15)
Reduce training (n=13)
0
0
3
1
0
0
4
4
6
2
13
12
10
8
11
Quality Enhancing
Increase the use of technology (n=13)
Increase quality of service (n=13)
0
1
3
4
10
8
Ad hoc/Reactive
Increase prices (n=17)
Reduce profits (n=16)
3
6
7
3
7
7
5. Conclusion
The major drawback with traditional economic theory is that it can be seen to be
theoretically naïve and empirically inaccurate in its conceptualisation of a rational
‘economic man’ which is increasingly at odds with the actual complexity of human
behaviour in social settings (Prasch, and Sheth, 1999). On a similar note, the use of
the archetype of the rational worker has the potential to distort researches and
amplify misconceptions when looking at pay-regulation and its impact on behaviour.
It follows that policy makers should rather take into account the full diversity of
workers in terms of region, gender, race, age, skill and educational attainment to
ensure that a regulation implemented to improve the well being of the low paid does
not ultimately create any substantial adverse effect, not only on the general
employment level but also on each sub group.
The characteristics of the workforce profile of hospitality businesses in North Wales
and North Manchester in this study seem to follow a similar pattern. Young workers
are significant for employers in both areas and, as expected, there is heavier reliance
on part-time and female workers. Therefore whether the area is rural or urban, young
20
workers play an important role in this industry. The only difference is that there are
likely to be greater numbers of type of workers available in urban areas compared to
the rural areas, hence the extent of employers’ choice depends on the pattern of the
labour market in their respective area.
Differences in wages between two different regions or areas, especially urban and
rural areas, are inevitable. Low average wages are known to be a persistent
occurrence in rural areas, thus the imposition of a NMW is expected to have greater
consequences for a rural area in a low pay region as compared to an urban area. A
number of the respondents in this study seem to be paying young workers at the
youth development rate. This is unlike the findings of the study by Lucas and
Langlois (2000) that observed “younger workers’ pay on the whole was comfortably
above the youth development rate, even for workers under 18, particularly in
hospitality” (p63). There is clear evidence that the youth development rate is being
utilised in North Wales (6) and North Manchester (2) by a sizeable minority, hence if
any drastic changes to this rate occurred, it could have significant implications for
the employers in these low paying areas.
In spite of any effect that the introduction of the youth development rate may have
had on wages in a number of workplaces in North Wales and North Manchester, the
vast majority of businesses did not indicate that this had led to any drastic changes in
the overall level of employment. There was also no visible shift in favour of the
employment of cheaper young labour at the expense of older workers in either the
urban or rural area. At present, substitution of either group may not take place,
although this might turn out to be otherwise in the near future.
The latest increase in the youth development rate did not result in any drastic
measures being taken by employers in terms of employment practices in both North
Wales and North Manchester. A majority of the employers who were affected by this
increase were contemplating carrying out reactive/ad hoc actions by increasing prices
of products/services or accepting a lower profit margin, rather than pursuing a
strategic action of cost-minimisation or quality enhancement. Only one respondent
raised the issue of having to increase wages in order to maintain pay differentials
among employees. Training does not seem to be an important element of
employment policy in the hospitality sector for firms in North Wales and North
21
Manchester. Therefore the introduction of the NMW has not in any way affected the
resources allocated for training. Even for those who do provide training opportunities
for their workers, the opportunity for employees to be involved in training has not
adversely been affected.
It is important to note that as the findings of this pilot study are based on a small
sample size, it does not represent the viewpoint of businesses in the hospitality sector
in general. However, it does suggest the preferences and positions of businesses in
the hospitality sector in terms of the NMW. At the current youth development rate of
£3.20 per hour, employment practices of these businesses whether it is in rural or
urban areas seem not to have been affected drastically. This may suggest that the
minimum wage has not reached the pivotal point (at which it financially ‘bites’)
whilst further increases in the rate may not guarantee the firms’ present employment
practices. Therefore in general whether or not the minimum wage policy has an
adverse affect on employment depends greatly on the level at which the minimum
wage is set. The pilot study confirms that there is a need for further research in
evaluating the implications of the NMW for young workers, and also for looking at
the strategies undertaken by businesses, particularly in rural areas if there is a
substantial increase in the NMW rate.
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